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ABSTRACT

The proliferation of genetically modified ("GM") crops in the United States has dramatically
increased in the past two decades. This increase has led to fears of dwindling biodiversity in this
country's staple crops. Consumer health and environmental advocates have attempted to slow the
deregulation of such crops through administrative challenges. Such tactics were largely undermined
in the 2010 Supreme Court case of Monsanto Co. v. Geertson. Anti-GM groups have subsequently
attempted to invalidate patents for GM crops on moral grounds. This comment explores the futility
of administrative and moral challenges to GM crop proliferation, and looks ahead to the proper legal
vehicle for actual contamination. Further, this comment proposes the use of punitive damages to
provide adequate market incentive for patent holders of genetically modified crops to control
unwanted contamination.
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HONEY GET MY GUN, THE TRANSGENIC SEEDS ARE IN THE FIELD AGAIN
CHRISTIAN B. MILLER*

INTRODUCTION

The late pulp-prophet Michael Crichton must not have alarmed the highest
court in the land. In one of his last fictional works, Prey, Crichton cast scientific
uncertainty as a lead theme. 1 The book foretold swarms of human-created nanobots
that wreaked havoc when they escaped captivity. 2 In the summer of 2010, the
Supreme Court declined to enjoin planters of genetically modified ("GM") alfalfa
before the completion of an in-depth environmental study. 3 This decision is
indicative of the Court's confidence in the federal government's ability to manage
scientific uncertainty, be it nanobots or alfalfa plots. 4 The Court sided with the
United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") regulators and the owners of the
genetically modified organism ("GMO"), finding that despite the USDA's admitted
breach of procedure and limited ability to oversee GMO farmers, partial deregulation
bore little risk to non-GMO organic farmers. 5
This comment aims to predict the future course of GMO litigation, in light of
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson,6 such that a balance is struck between the nascent
technology and the preservation of biodiversity.
Throughout human history, the diversity of food crops has declined.7
In
America, ninety-seven percent of commercial varieties once sold in 1900 are no longer
commercially available to the public, replaced by a handful of staple crops. 8
Currently, only fifteen staple crops account for more than ninety percent of the
world's food. 9 The rise of a monoculture in American farming coincides with the
corporatization of the farm and the mass adoption of fertilizers, pesticides,
herbicides, and standard harvesting equipment. 1 0 A majority of the two largest

*C) Christian B. Miller 2011. J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The John Marshall Law School.
Articles Editor of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law. B.S. Mechanical
Engineering, The Ohio State University, 2006.
1 See William Grimes, Michael Crichton, Author of 'JurassicPark' and Other Thrillers, Dies at
66, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A31.
2 Id. at A31. Crichton made a writing career out of identifying the potential dangers involved

with budding areas of science, especially biotechnology. See Id.
3See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2749, 2749 (2010).
4 Id. at 2760-61. In this case, the Court overruled a district court decision that enjoined a
branch of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") from deregulating a genetically
modified ("GM") form of alfalfa. Id.
5
1d. at 2759-61.
6Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2749.
7PETER PRINGLE, FOOD, INC.: MENDEL TO MONSANTO-THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF THE
BIOTECH HARVEST 39 (Simon & Schuster 2005).

81d.

9 NOEL

KINGSBURY, HYBRID:

THE HISTORY AND SCIENCE OF PLANT BREEDING 408 (Univ. of

Chicago 2009).
10 DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO A FOOD AND FARM BILL 38-42 (Univ.
of California 2007).
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staple crops being planted in America are genetically modified."
Given the
prevalence of GM crops, the articulated fear of gene flow between GM and non-GM
varieties is founded more on probability than on possibility. 12
Along with the proliferation of GM crops, a pro-GMO patent owner regulatory
structure has arisen in America. 13
Organic seed producers, human health
organizations, and environmental defense groups argue that deregulation of GM
crops has released untested artificial organisms into the environment. 14 Possessing
little political power, 15 and with the regulatory branches staffed by GM industry
executives, 1 6 these groups resort to the courts as a method to improve oversight. 17
The Food and Drug Administration's deregulation of GMOs, however, subsequent to
Geertson, indicates that regulation will continue in a pro-industry direction.18
Political limitations on the judiciary would seem to prevent groups from further
challenging GMO deregulation decisions in the future. 19 There must be a shift in the
way the court views GMO intellectual property, from commodity to a trespassing
nuisance, if organic farming groups are to be successful in attaining future injunctive
relief.
This comment connects the scientific uncertainty assumptions of federal
regulatory agencies to recent anti-GMO litigation and forecasts the necessary judicial
treatment of GM intellectual property. Such treatment could prevent future litigation
and balance a nascent technology with the preservation of biodiversity.
Part I of this paper looks at biotechnology in the development of American
farming and the structure of federal regulation of GMOs in light of their potential
benefits and risks. Part II analyzes recent cases where plaintiffs sought to prevent
GM crop proliferation through administrative challenges. Finally, Part III forecasts
the probable roadblocks to future litigation under regulatory challenges and suggests

11Id. at 118.

12See Gregory N. Mandel, The North American Symposium on the Judiciary and
Environmental Law: The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication, 23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 83, 90 (2006).
13 PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 63 (noting that Monsanto, a St. Louis-based corporation, has
obtained a ninety percent world market share of direct GM seed sales or licenses under the current
regulatory scheme); Debra Strauss, The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intellectual
Property Rights and Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 287, 289-90 (2009).
14 Tom Lutey, Genetically Modified Variety Worries Organic Seed, Food Safety Groups,
BILLINGS

GAZETTE

(Jan.

20,

2010),

http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-

regional/montana/articleab4f535a-05fd- 11ldf-a8bf-OOcc4cOO2eO.html.
15 Phillip Connors, Holding Their Ground: How Family Farmers Are Joining Forces to Fend
Off Corporate 'Serfdom', CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 2003, at C1O.
16See, e.g., Tom Philpott, Brushing Aside Pressure, Obama to Tap Big-Ag Man as USDA Chief,
GRIST (Dec. 17, 2008, 2:03 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/Sack-it-to-em-/.
17 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
18 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Modified Salmon is Safe, F.D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010,
at B1 (addressing that farmers of GM alfalfa expect a finished environmental study from the FDA
by the end of 2010).
19 See generally Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 5. Ct. 2743, 2754-56 (2010)
(illustrating how GM petitioners in Geertson challenged organic alfalfa respondents' standing:
should the USDA continue to deregulate GM alfalfa after completion of the environmental study,
the court would be hard-pressed to interfere with the discretion of the agency even when acting in
equity).
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alternative legal routes to better strike a balance between natural biodiversity and
commercial exploitation of GMOs.

I. BACKGROUND

As stated earlier, this comment aims to predict the future course of GMO
litigation, in light of Geertson. In order to understand the tactics of anti-GMO
parties, it is necessary to understand the regulatory regime covering GMOs and
GMO legal history within the United States. This background will explore the
history of biodiversity, the technology of genetic modification, the GMO regulatory
scheme, and recent GMO litigation.
When humans first began domesticating other species, they manipulated the
genes of flora and fauna. 20 At the turn of the century many of the crops being grown
in the United States were actually non-native to North America. 2 1 These included
Japanese radishes and Turkish figs. 22 Breeders used species' natural reproduction to
strengthen a desired trait by selective breeding of species exhibiting the trait. 23 This
traditional, vertical inheritance of genetic traits from previous generations was time
consuming and required multiple iterations of offspring. 24

A. The Rise of Genetically Modified Crops

The arrival of genetic manipulation techniques in the 1980s represented a
significant change in methodology for American plant breeding. 25
Genetic
modification introduces or manipulates genes within an organism. 26 One method of
genetic modification reverses the gene responsible for a trait, preventing expression
of that trait.27 A second method of genetic introduces genes from a foreign organism
with the desired trait into a host organism. 28 The method of introducing foreign
genes between unrelated organisms is known as horizontal inheritance. 29 Prior to
the 1980s, living organisms were denied protection under U.S. patent law. 30 Yet with
the development of genetic engineering, humans began actively supplanting natural

20 KINGSBURY,

supra note 9, at 17.

21Id. at 148.
22 Id.
23 PRINGLE,

supra note 7, at 38-39.

24 Id.
25 KINGSBURY,
26 PRINGLE,

supra note 9, at 398-99.
supra note 7, at 30-31.

27Id. at 69.
28
1d. at 30-31.

29David Bricker, Plant Genetics: Plant Genes Imported from Unrelated Species More Often
Than Previously Thought, LIFE SCI. WKLY., July 28, 2003, at 4.
30 See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 306, 318 (1980) (holding that living
organisms were not thought to be a novel creation of mankind but rather products of nature, as
humans were merely facilitating the natural breeding of organisms).
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processes and creating novel organisms that did not previously exist in nature. 31 The
2
landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty3
held that whether or not an inventor's
creation was a living organism had no bearing on patent protection.33 In the ruling,
the Supreme Court dismissed moral arguments against the patentability of life. 34
Even with this precedent, it was unclear if patent protection would pertain to plants
because of existing plant protection statutes. 35 The subsequent cases of Ex parte
Hibberd36 and J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l37 found that the
protection afforded to plant breeders under plant protection statutes did not foreclose
plant patentability under sectionl01 of the Patent Act. 38
In the decades since Chakrabarty, the adoption of GM crops for animal feed and
human food ingredients was dramatic. 39 Most of these crops were engineered for two
specific traits: (1) resistance to applied herbicides or pesticides; and, (2) internal
manufacture of a pesticide. 40

B. Plant Property Rights
The function of the American government during the first half of the twentieth
century, with respect to plant breeding, was one of biodiversity promotion. 41 There
existed seed distribution programs which made novel plant varieties available to
farmers across the country. 42 The first property rights for asexually reproducing
plants were bestowed by the Plant Patent Act of 1930 ("PPA"). 43 This property right
was extended to sexually-reproducing plants in 1970 with the Plant Variety
Protection Act ("PVPA"). 44
In the 1930s, hybrid seeds began to gain popularity among farmers. 45 Hybrid
seeds produced higher yields than plants from traditional seeds. 46 This hybridization
supra note 7, at 58-59.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; Keith Aoki, Seeds of Dispute: Seeds of Dispute: IntellectualProperty Rights and Agricultural Biodiversity, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 100-01 (2009).
33 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-1.
34 Id. at 316-17.
31 PRINGLE,
32

We are told that genetic research and related technological developments may

spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and
that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments
are forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at times, human
ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it creates.
Id.
35 See Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (B.P.A.I. 1985); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145-46 (2001).
36 Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 444.
37 J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 145-46.
381dg
39 IMHOFF,

supra note 10, at 118-19.

40 Id.

41Aoki, supra note 32, at 85-86.
42 Id.
44

Id. at 98-99.
45 PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 12.
46Dan Charles & Daniel Zwerdling, Seed Technology:

Interview with Harry Collins,
Executive, Delta and Pine Land Co.; Hope Shand, Rural Advancement Foundation Int'l; and M.S.
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perk only lasted for a single season, or the first hybrid generation. 47 Therefore,
hybrid seed companies had a steady customer base of farmers who wished to attain
the higher yields year after year. 48
After World War II, the availability of nitrogen fertilizers, chemical pesticides,
and chemical herbicides led to what is referred to as the "Green Revolution." 49
Instead of breeding crops to suit a particular environment, a single monoculture of
crop was bred and the environment was shaped to suit this crop. 50 Higher yields
during the Green Revolution resulted in lower commodity prices for the average
crop. 51 With the profit-margin for farming decreasing, many small farmers were
forced to sell to large corporate farms. 52 From 1960 to 2000 the number of farms in
America fell from 5.38 million to 2.17 million. 53

C. Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops
The current regulatory policies for genetically modified foods came into existence
during the Reagan administration in 1984.54 The White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy was responsible for setting the final regulatory agenda for GM
food.55 Under the direction of former and current heads of large seed and chemical
companies, the adopted rules centered on self-regulation by the creators of GM
products. 56 Regulators reasoned that if the food product created from a GMO was
substantially similar to its natural counterpart, then there was no need for any
heightened regulation.5 7 The means to produce the GMO would not be subject to
scrutiny.58

The final task of regulating of GMOs fell upon three governmental bodies: the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the USDA, and the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). 59 The FDA was tasked with determining the safety of
GM ingredients in food products. 60 The EPA monitored only those GMOs that

Swaminathan, Former Director, Int'l Rice Research Institute (NPR radio broadcast May 17, 1998,
8:31 PM) (transcript No. 98051706-216 on file with NPR).
4

7Id.

48

Id.

49 PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 47, 53.
50

Agricultural Research Service, Milestones in ARS Research, AGRIC. RES., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at

4, 5.
51 Michael Schuman, Back to the Land: The New Green Revolution, TIME (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1930363-1,00.html.
52 IMHOFF, supra note 10, at 38-49.
53Id. at 40.
54 PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY,
GUIDE To U.S. REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 5, (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter PEW].
55 Id. at 5-6.
56 PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 61-62 (citing Kurt Eichenwald et al., Biotechnology Food: From
Lab
to a Debacle, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan.
25,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/25/
business/25FOOD.htm).
58

PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 61-62.
54, at 8, fig. 1.
Id. at ii.

SD
PEW, supra note
60
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produce pesticides internally. 61 Finally, the USDA was given authority to make
regulatory decisions concerning the potential pest risks of GM crops. 62 According to
the National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA"), the USDA must complete an
environmental assessment ("EA") before it may grant a deregulation request for a
GM crop. 63 If the EA finds that there is no significant impact to the human
environment due to regulation, the USDA is not required to prepare an
Environmental Impact Study ("EIS").64 The EIS is an in-depth study of the specific
environmental impacts that a government decision will have, the alternatives for the
decision, and an analysis of the possible alternatives. 65
Regulation of GMOs in the European Union takes an alternative approach
toward GMO release. 66 The EU's conservative approach toward the deregulation of
GM crops involves the precautionary principle. 67 Where substantial similarity
equates GM products to their natural counterparts if they are similar enough, the
precautionary principle does not equate the two. 68
Proponents of GM crops hold that genetic engineering can aid plants in adapting
to climate change and provide increased yields to fight world hunger. 69 They further
view the swapping of genes from disparate organisms as roughly a plug-and-play
technique. 70 They equate horizontal inheritance and vertical inheritance.7 1
The risks of GM plants and food byproducts to human health and environment
center on the unpredictability of the GMO in nature.72 One health concern is that
food derivatives from GMOs may have yet-to-be-observed adverse effects on human
health. 73 Another significant health concern is that otherwise non-toxic plants will
become toxic due to the introduction of foreign genes. 74 The environmental risk of
GM food centers on the inadvertent transfer of genes, or gene flow. 75 Foreign genes
from GM plants could spread to their vertically-bred counterparts in nature. 76

61 Id. at iii.
62

Id.

63 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C-08-00484, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86343, *14-15

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009); cf 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(d) (nothing in the C.F.R. mandates that APHIS
conduct an EA for a deregulation decision).
64 See Ctr. for Food Safety, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86343 at *14.
65 PEW, supra note 54, at 4.
66 Aoki, supra note 32, at 141.
67 Id.
68
1d. at 140-41.

69 Dennis Normile, Rockefeller to End Network After 15 Years of Success, 286 SCI. 1468, 146869 (Nov. 1999).
70 PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 58-59.

71Id.
72 See generally Alan J. Gray, Ecology and Government Policies: The GM Crop Debate, 41 J.

APPLIED ECOLOGY 1, 6-7 (2004) (attributing to a lack of publicly available data concerning the
health and safety risks).
73 See PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 63-64 (noting that unknown human health effects may not be
adequately tested for in the laboratory under the substantial similarity threshold).
74 Aoki, supra note 32, at 141-43.
7S Deborah Strauss, Genetically Modified Organisms in Food:
A Model of Labeling and
Monitoring with Positive Implications for InternationalTrade, 40 INT'L LAW. 95, 97 (2006).
76 Natasha Gilbert, GM Crop Escapes into American Wild, NATURE NEWS (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100806/full/news.2010.393.html.
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D. Contamination in the Courts
The rigid concepts of patent infringement clashed with the practice among
farmers to save their seed from year to year.7
Monsanto and other GM seed
companies pursued farmers who did not pay the requisite licenses for planting
GMOs. 78 Eventually, a new type of GM case arose, casting the patented genetic
material as an invasive species. 79 Farmers with contaminated fields have made
claims ranging from trespass to nuisance against GMO patent holders. 80 Another
tactic was explored when organic seed farmers and human health advocates filed
suits to enjoin the USDA from deregulating GM crops. 81 The preeminent cases in
this vein are Geertson and Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack. 82 Both challenge the
government's assessments in preparing EAs without an EIS for potentially serious
environmental risks. 83

II. ANALYSIS

A. Reviewing Environmental Decisions in the Court
This comment aims to predict the future course of GMO litigation, in light of
Geertson. In order to understand the future of GMO litigation, one must analyze the
attitude of the judiciary toward regulatory agency action. The following analysis will
explore the APA as a framework of challenging governmental action, the judicial
attitude toward regulatory action in the Geertson case, and finally the judicial
attitude toward regulatory action in the related Vilsack case.
When reviewing the validity of an executive agency's action the courts are
guided by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 84 A court will uphold agency
actions unless they are found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 85
Under regulations created by the Council on Environmental Quality, 86 an
agency must prepare an EA in order to determine if an action will significantly affect

77PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 97.

78See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754-55 (2010); First Am.
Complaint 4, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n. v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-cv-2163 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 2011) [hereinafter Organic Seed Growers Complaint].
80 See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06MD1811, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114731,
at *117-19 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009).
81 Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2750-51.
82 See Paul Voosen, Courts Force U.S. Reckoning with Dominance of GM Crops, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/10/08/08greenwire-courts-force-us-reckoningwith-dominance-of-gm-43684.html?pagewanted= all.
83 Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2749; Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 948, 950-51 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).
84Ka Makani '0 Kohala Ohana, Inc. v. Dept. of Water Supply, 295 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.
2002).
85 Id.

86See Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the human environment.87 If there is likely to be a significant impact, an EIS must
be initiated.8 8 An agency cannot rely on unsupported assumptions in the EA, 89 and
must give a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of an action. 90 If a party
can show substantial questions of a significant environmental impact, then an EIS
must be conducted. 91 The significance of a proposed action must be determined by
the agency based on both the action's intensity and the context of the action. 92
Intensity may be aggravated by general factors such as uncertainty of risk, effect on
public health, or the controversial nature of the agency action. 93

B. The District Court's Findings in Geertson
In Geertson, APHIS ultimately issued a finding of no significant impact on the
environment, granting Monsanto's deregulation request for GM alfalfa. 94 APHIS
made several unsupported statements in its EA with regard to the risks of
deregulating roundup-ready alfalfa. 95 APHIS based its conclusion that there was no
risk to organic populations of alfalfa by assuming that organic farmers could prevent
contamination. 96
APHIS reached this determination despite admitting:
(1)
pollinators and wind could transmit GM pollen up to two miles; 97 and, (2) APHIS
would have no control over the proximity of the GM crop to non-transgenic crops once
GM alfalfa was deregulated. 98 APHIS also argued that the complete loss of all nontransgenic alfalfa would not be considered a significant environmental impact per
NEPA. 99 The court found APHIS's deregulation decision capricious and unfounded
because the agency's conclusions: (1) ignored whether organic farmers could prevent
contamination; and (2) did not fully appreciate the significance of contamination
upon deregulation. 100 Additionally, the court noted one of NEPA's statutory aims
was to preserve biodiversity. 101
The district court also found fault with APHIS's determination that the
development of herbicide-resistant weeds was not a significant environmental
impact.102 APHIS had reasoned that such weeds had resulted from deregulation of
GM crops on prior occasions and thus were not significant in this instance. 1 03 This
87Id.
88 Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 402 F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2005).
89 Id.
90

Id.

91 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
92 Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 865.
93 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (2006).
94 Geertson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14533, at *6.
95Id.
at *6-7,21.
96Id.

97 Id. at *5.
98Id. at *15.
09 Id. at *25.
100 See id. at *18-21.
101 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b)(4) (2006).
102 Geertson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14533, at *29.
103 Id.; see generally, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the House Oversight
and Comm. on Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (testimony of William Freese, Science Policy
Analyst, Ctr. for Food Safety), (explaining that weed resistance to herbicidal application arises out
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justification ignored the cumulative effect that GM alfalfa would have on herbicidal
resistant weeds, and such cumulative effects are required to be analyzed under
NEPA. 104
When issuing its injunction, the district court in Geertson refused to accept
APHIS's intermediate proposals for quarantining GM alfalfa while the EIS was being
completed. 105 The court reasoned that it was maintaining the status quo of limited
planting of GM alfalfa while its effects on the environment were fully explored-a
process that should have preceded any deregulation decision. 1 06 In weighing the
balance of harms to all parties, the court found the potential environmental harm to
outweigh the harm to those who wished to plant GM alfalfa. 107 The court did,
however adopt remedial quarantine measures suggested by APHIS for GM seed
already purchased by farmers in reliance on the deregulation decision. 108 This
equitable grant given to farmers would be the undoing of the district court's decision
in the Supreme Court. 109

C. The Supreme Court Analysis in Geertson
Justice Alito, writing for the Supreme Court's majority, criticized both the grant
of injunction 1 o and the agency-neutralizing breadth of the district court's
injunction.111 The Court reaffirmed that the only test for granting a plaintiffs
request for permanent injunction constitutes four factors: (1) without the injunction,
the plaintiff will endure irremediable injury; (2) monetary damages will not
adequately compensate the plaintiff; (3) the balance of harms weighs in favor of the
injunction; and (4) the injunction is not contrary to the public welfare. 1 1 2 The Court
found none of the four factors favored the Geertson respondents. 11 3 Despite this
statement, the Court did not reason through the balance of harms to both parties,
nor the public's interest in an injunction. 114 Instead, the Court focused solely on the
first factor, and doubted the possibility of irrevocable harm to the respondents. 115 In
revisiting the facts of the case, the Court gave more weight to the proposed interim

of the artificial environmental pressure caused by the application itself; any weeds that are
genetically resistant to herbicide will survive application and pass their genes to subsequent
generations. There will be little to no competition, as their non-resistance counterparts die off by
the hand of the herbicide. Thus weedy progeny increasingly contain the resistance).
104Geertson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14533 at *30-31.
105Geertson Farms, Inc. v. Mike Johanns, No. C-06-01075, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32701, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2007).
106 Id. at *22.
107 Id. at *19.
108Id. at *25.
109Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2759 (2010).
110Id. at 2758.
111Id. at 2761.

112eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
113Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2758.
114See generally, id. at 2758-62 (focusing solely on the ability of APHIS to partially-deregulate
GM alfalfa in a way that will not harm organic populations, the Court makes no mention of the more
controversial issues of public interest and balancing economic harm vs. environmental harm).
115Id. at 2760.
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regulatory measures proposed by APHIS. 11 6 It was reasoned that if APHIS could set
quarantine measures, limit the proximity of GM alfalfa to organic crops, and monitor
the process, there would not be any gene flow into organic farms. 117 By allowing
some alfalfa to be planted and harvested, the Court reasoned that the district court
had admitted APHIS could take preventative measures to prevent gene flow,
otherwise such planting would not be acceptable. 118
The other prong of the Supreme Court's disagreement with the district court
ruling was that a permanent injunction effectively eliminated the executive agency's
role in determining interim measures for deregulation. 119 This was a violation of the
basic separation of powers between the judiciary and executive branch. 120 While the
Court admitted that enjoining APHIS from fully-deregulating GM alfalfa until it
completed an EIS was within judicial power, the injunction interfered with APHIS's
congressionally-vested power to partially-deregulate. 121

D. The Stevens Dissent in Geertson
Justice Stevens, penning the sole dissent, took issue with the majority for their
faith in the agency to affect any manner of partial deregulation. 122 Stevens pointed
out that even in controlled settings the GM crop could cross-pollinate, APHIS had
never partially-deregulated any GM crop and had no resources to monitor its
proposed interim measures, and organic populations could not be decontaminated
should the GM gene enter their ranks. 1 23 Here, Stevens observed that the district
court may have feared that allowing a partial deregulation would warp the final EIS
determination and pave the way for total deregulation. 124
With respect to the separation of powers argument made by the majority,
Stevens was adamant that the district court was well within its equitable powers in
preventing APHIS from making any deregulation decisions until it had studied the
matter in-depth with an EIS. 1 25 Equitable remedies require a balancing of harms to
the adverse parties, 126 and a tight sculpting of relief no broader than that required. 127
Accordingly, Stevens did not find the allowance of some farmers to continue planting
GM alfalfa to be a discontinuity, as it was merely balancing an acceptable risk of
gene flow with the farmers' financial burden. 128 The specific partial deregulation
that APHIS sought as an alternative to permanent injunction, was found to be
insufficient in preventing unwanted cross-pollination Stevens notes. 1 29 The district
116 Id.

117Id.
118 Id. at 2759.

Id. at 2761.
id. at 2758.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 2770-71.
123 Id. at 2770-72.
124 Id. at 2772.
125 Id.
126eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
127See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 392-93 (1996).
128Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2769.
129 Id. at 2771-72.
119

120 See
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court, guided by the statutory intent behind NEPA (necessitating that government
actors make informed environmental decisions), had the power to find inappropriate
any deregulation action before further environmental study. 130

E. The District Court's Ruling in Center for Food Safety
Similar to the facts of Geertson, the Northern District of California sustained
another plaintiffs challenge to APHIS's deregulation determination in an EA. 1 31 The
court in Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 132 was vocal in its displeasure that ninetyfive percent of the beet industry consisted of GM beets while an EIS was being
conducted. APHIS's argument in this case was that full deregulation would occur
regardless of the information uncovered by the EIS. 1 33
The remedial measures hearing in this case, occurred after the Supreme Court
decision in Geertson, shows the new reluctance of the court to enjoin APHIS. The
district court misread Geertson and applied a non-existent modification to injunctive
relief. 134 It read the Geertson majority too literally and denies the plaintiffs' request
to permanently enjoin planting of GM beets because any harm the injunction sought
to prevent was "future harm." 135 Permanent injunctions have traditionally been
available for present and impending irreparable injury. 136 Much of the equitable
power of the judiciary would be lost if a court were not able to enjoin a party from
committing a future harm under the district court's reasoning. Additionally, this
concept of injunction is repugnant to the settled concepts of standing, where a party
may bring suit so long as the issue is ripe. 1 37 Ripeness requires an actual or
impending harm to the plaintiff, not mere speculation. 1 38 In Food Safety, the
130Id. at 2771.
131 The factual background of Center for Food is nearly identical to that of Geertson. Ctr. for
Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C-08-00484, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86343, at *28-30 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21,
2009).
132Ctr. For Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
133 Id. at 953.

134See id. at 954-55.
135 Id. at
136 1-10A

955.
MOORE'S MANUAL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 10A.20 (Mathew Bender

2010).
Because it is prospective only, injunctive relief will not be granted unless the
claimant shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the claimant will prevail
on the merits of the claim, and that the defending party's wrongful act or omission
will occur in the future. To determine the likelihood of future wrongdoing, the
court should consider whether: (1) the defendant's wrong was isolated or part of a
pattern, (2) whether the wrong was flagrant and deliberate or merely technical in
nature, and (3) whether the defendant's business or activities will present
opportunities to violate the law in the future. None of these three factors is
determinative; rather, the district court should determine the propensity for
future wrong based on the totality of circumstances.
Id. A court "balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they
may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 440 (1944) (emphasis added).
137See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 5. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010).
138See id. at 2753-54. "To prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication,
from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
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deregulation of the GM beet posed similar harm of contamination as did GM alfalfa
even the Geertson majority recognized that it was in the power of the court to fully
estop future planting of GM crops. 1 39
The district court's approach toward the equitable powers of the court in Food
Safety differs greatly from that of the Stevens dissent. 140
Characterizing the judicial treatment of potential harm in the GM crop
deregulation cases provides insight into the case outcomes. Both the District Court
and Justice Stevens in Geertson focused on three issues regarding GM alfalfa
deregulation: containment, oversight, and administrative objectivity. Both point out
the lack of certainty in containment measures, the logistical inability of APHIS to
enforce GM containment protocols, and APHIS's less than objective environmental
assessments. Meanwhile, the Alito opinion in Geertson and the district court in Food
Safety, revisited earlier factual determinations to come to radically different views in
these areas. They held that contamination was either speculative or could be
controlled, and gave APHIS full credit to conduct deregulation activities before any
in-depth environmental research had been completed. 141
With the Supreme Court's ruling in Geertson, and subsequent application in
Food Safety, a judicial mandate requiring the creation of an EIS may not result in
substantive relief.142
Non-administrative law measures for preventing and limiting pollen drift are
discussed in the following section.

III. PROPOSAL: REVIVING AN OLD TORT TO FIGHT A NEW HARM
In order to predict the future course of GMO litigation, in light of Geertson, it is
necessary to understand the alternative routes of limiting unwanted GMO
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized
and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148-49 (1967). Given the doubts expressed by Justice Stevens regarding APHIS's ability to
monitor partially-deregulated GM crops, it follows that plaintiffs in Center for Food Safety would
have a valid fear of contamination. Even with GM beets returned to full regulation, they comprise
ninety-five percent of the beet market, and this prevalence lends itself to an increased difficulty in
monitoring as well as increased probability for contamination.
139See generally Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2758-61 (noting that plaintiffs could seek injunction
once APHIS has attempted to partially deregulate GM alfalfa and the impropriety of the present
injunction stemmed from foreclosing the exercise the statutory power of partial deregulation).
140 The district court additionally sided with economic interests when determining whether to
issue a preliminary injunction. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Schafer, No. C-08-00484, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35808 at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2010). It detailed the potential costs to the beet growing
and refining industry in America, arriving at a daunting 1.5 billion dollar price tag for an injunction.
Id. This reasoning sends a message to GM producers: maximize market saturation and vigorously
promote GM adoption after deregulation in order to make enjoinment costs prohibitive.
141Ctr. fOr Food v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955-54 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010). Even after
the district court in Center for Food characterized the harm of GM beets as substantial when it
vacated APHIS's EA and in its analysis for preliminary injunction, it recast the harms as
speculative following the Supreme Court decision in Geertson. Id.
142See generally Dina Bear, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Implementation of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 952-53 (2003) (observing that NEPA
is a procedural imposition on federal agencies).
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proliferation. The following proposal will summarize the faults with administrative
challenges to GMO deregulation, explore legal remedies to prevent actual
contamination of non-GMO crops, and suggest the imposition of punitive damages
upon GMO patentees in order properly dissuade contamination.
Groups attempting to halt the deregulation of GMOs appear to be litigating a
lost cause. 143 Several factors, mentioned throughout this comment, make it doubtful
that anti-GMO groups will succeed in halting deregulation. These are: (1) the
Supreme Court's faith in APHIS's ability to prevent unwanted contamination; 144 (2)
APHIS will continue to deregulate GMOs under the substantial similarity viewpoint;
and (3) deregulation decisions subsequent to NEPA litigation indicate that the USDA
will approve deregulation requests even after performing an EIS. 1 45
With deregulation challenges serving merely as delay tactics for organic crop
producers, future litigation will turn on either actual contamination of nontransgenic crops by GMOs or attacking GMO patents themselves. Recent litigation
attacking GMO patents attempts to revive morality in patent law 1 46-a route
seemingly
foreclosed
post- Chakrabarty.1 47
Litigation
concerning
actual
contamination has already been brought in both America1 48 and Canada. 1 49 The two
overriding issues for such cases are: (1) who should bear the burden for remedying
unwanted contamination and (2) under what theory of recovery should plaintiffs
attain compensation? 15 0
Both legislative and executive measures have been
suggested to impose liability for contamination. 151

A. Legislative and Executlve Proposals
It has been proposed that the burden for contamination should be assigned by
statute. 152 This pathway would augment judicial actions to provide civil penalties
that are consistent and predictable to litigants. 1 53 However, efforts to implement
statutory assignment of fault have been unsuccessful in America. 154 The political
process does not favor the organic food producer, who is pitted against seemingly
inseparable joint obstacle of the biotech industry-regulatory agency. 15 5 Another

143See Stephen Clapp, Both Sides Declare Victory in Supreme Court Roundup Ready Alfalfa
Ruling, BIOTECHNOLOGY PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, June 28, 2010, at 1.
144Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2760 (2010).
145 Id.

146 E.g., Organic Seed Growers Complaint, supra note 79, at 4.
147 Juicy Whip., Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
148In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (Ill.
1997).
149 Jane Matthews Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene Wandering in Canada,
43 WASHBURN L.J. 547, 550 (2004).
150 Id. at 547.
151 Id. at 551, 571.
152 Id. at 558-59.
153 Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 215, 223 (2002).
154 Id. at 239.

155 See Glenn, supra note 149, at 570.
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legislative suggestion is the creation of a grain indemnity fund for contamination. 1 56
Such funds exist to compensate farmers whose crops are ruined by disease or
contamination. 15 7 A major drawback for such a system is that contaminating sources
would not be stopped from continuing to contaminate.15 8
Some commentators have suggested creating a new executive body to adequately
enforce anti-contamination measures.1 59
Considering that agencies currently
charged with such powers do not have the resources to prevent contamination, 1 60
additional unfunded bureaucracy is unlikely to adequately address contamination
concerns.
Judicial remedies for crop contamination by GMOs would appear to be the only
practical means by which organic farmers may be compensated for future
contamination. There are many suggestions as to which existing civil action is most
suitable for GMO litigation. 161 The list spans historic torts such as trespass and
nuisance to the utilization of more modern causes of action such as strict liability. 162
Those ultimately liable for contamination, be it neighboring farmer or GMO patent
holder, depends on the chosen cause of action. 163
Conceptually, the most fitting causes of action for contamination of crops by
GMOs would be the invasive torts of private nuisance and trespass.

B. Nuisance
The tort of private nuisance requires an apparent invasion of one's property
interest. 164 This tort has been reserved for outside conduct that negatively affects the
use and enjoyment of one's property. 165 Recall that to succeed on a claim of private
nuisance, a plaintiff must show that the invasion is: (1) substantial; (2) is the result
of intentional or negligent conduct; and (3) is unreasonable. 1 66 Applied to GMO
contamination, a jury could find a substantial and unreasonable interference to the
organic farmer whose harvest is interrupted. 167
Unfortunately, proving negligent or intentional conduct may be impossible for
the organic farmer for two reasons. 168 First, in an area of multiple GM crop farms it

156 Neil D. Hamilton, New Legal Issues in the Biotechnology Policy Debate, 17 WASH. U. J.L. &
POLY 37, 54 (2005).
157 See id.
158 Id.

159See Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating Genetically
Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 393, 423 (2007).
160 See Geertson Seed Farms v.Johnanns, No. C-06-01075, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14533, at
*15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007).
161Grossman, supra note 153, at 215.
162 Id.
163See Glenn, supra note 149, at 554-59.
164Muscrello0 V.Ogle County Bd. of Commrs, 610 F.3d 416, 425 (7th Cir. 2010).
165Mandel, supra note 12, at 99.
166
In re Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 276-79 (Ill.
1997).
167
In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F.Supp. 2d 828, 847 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
168 But see In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06MD 1811, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
114731, at *119 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009).
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may not be possible to pinpoint where the offending GM pollen or seed originated. 169
Second, if the USDA has placed no restrictions on the deregulated GMO it would be
difficult to find a farmer negligent for growing it in proximity to an organic farm. 1 70

C. Trespass
The tort of trespass would seem to suffer from similar shortcomings for litigating
crop contamination as would nuisance. Trespass requires an outside action that
disrupts the exclusive right of ownership. 171 Organic farmers could have a claim for
trespass to property for unwanted first generation GMOs on their land, as well as a
claim for trespass to chattels for any offspring of the GMO and their own crop. 1 72
Because it would be patent infringement to harvest any GMO or GMO offspring, 1 73
the contaminated farm would have lost both control over its land and crop. Like the
tort of nuisance, however, it would be difficult to show the local source of the
trespassing genetic material, so any action would be most successful only when
brought against the GM patent owner. 174

D. Strict Liability
Utilizing strict liability for genetic contamination would solve the evidentiary
shortcomings of the trespass and nuisance torts, yet is not likely to be extended to
GMO contamination. 175 Strict liability for damages resulting from one's actions has
traditionally been reserved for inherently dangerous or abnormally risky operations
like blasting. 176 Generally, application of strict liability depends on risk to human
health, novelty of the action, and prevalence of those conducting the action in an
area. 177 As evidenced by the rapid adoption of GM crops in the soy, corn, and cotton
169See Glenn, supra note 149, at 556, 558.

170See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114731, at *120 ("[T]he
APHIS regulations cannot provide a basis for a negligence per se claim because those performance
standards do not provide a standard of care. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary
judgment on the negligence per se claims based on alleged APHIS violations ....
171 Grossman, supra note 153, at 230.
172See Mandel, supra note 12, at 95-96.
173See id. at 102.

174See Grossman, supra note 153, at 236. Trespass to chattels has been recognized as a valid
cause of action for genetic contamination of crops. In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F.
Supp. 2d 828, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
175See Grossman, supra note 153, at 238.
176 In re Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 280-81 (Ill. 1997).
177 Id. at 208-09. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
[T]he essential question is whether the risk created is so unusual, either because
of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the
imposition of strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is
carried on with all reasonable care. In other words, are its dangers and
inappropriateness for the locality so great that, despite any usefulness it may
have for the community, it should be required as a matter of law to pay for any
harm it causes, without the need of a finding of negligence.
Id.
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the novelty of GM crops is in decline. 178 In light of the increasing adoption
with the USDA stamp of substantial equivalence for deregulated crops, it
difficult to see how GMOs would qualify for strict liability under any of the
factors. 179

E. Punitive Damage Awards
A practical obstacle to long-term containment of GMOs exists, even if individual
farmers are successfully compensated under traditional tort theories. Ignoring the
cost of routine genetic testing, the litigation costs borne by farmers of non-transgenic
crops for repeated contamination look to be prohibitive. 180 Contamination may not be
a significant deterrent to large GM seed producers, as they are more likely to be
repeat players in litigation and have the funds to extend and delay litigation. 181 With
litigation pending, it may be years before an organic seed farmer sees any
compensation for initial contamination, during which time repeated contamination
might destroy the farmer's operations altogether.
Considering the disparate political and economic power between the minority of
organic seed farmers and the GMO intellectual property owner, a sufficient penalty
is required to deter undesirable contamination.
Punitive damage awards, in
conjunction with invasive tort liability, appear to be the sole practical remedy for
pollen drift. 182 Serving as a deterrent for future violations, courts typically award
punitive damages for willful or reckless disregard for the property rights of others. 183
Further, punitive damages are called for when a violation is difficult to monitor. 1 84
Allowing pollen-drift to occur where it is unwanted is a willful disregard for the
farmer's right to grow his or her crop of choice. Punitive damage awards would both
serve to enable the organic farmer to survive multiple incidents of contamination as
well as spur self-regulation among GMO farmers. 185
178See Hamilton, supra note 156, at 38.

179See Grossman, supra note 153, at 238.
180See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from
Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 125, 128-29 (2003) (explaining how the American system
dissuades merited, yet small claims).
181 See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Economics
of Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1220-21 (2005).
182See, e.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06MD1811, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
114731, at *135-37 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009) (illustrating how punitive damage claims have survived
in contamination scenarios).
The record on summary judgment shows that plaintiffs may be able to present
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Bayer was conscious that its
conduct would naturally or probably result in injury. Plaintiffs have evidence
showing that the risk of contamination by GM plants to non-GM plants was well
known at the time of the field tests here. Bayer knew that seeds could be
'admixed' through human error as simple as failing to clean equipment or boots,
and that cross-pollination could occur.
Id.
183 Id. at 134-35.
184Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494 (2008).
185 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 156, at 48-49 (illustrating existing contractual means in
which to control contamination).
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IV. CONCLUSION

After Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms, those who fear GM crops degrading
natural biodiversity will most likely not prevent deregulation under NEPA.
Deregulation considerations under the substantial similarity paradigm, are
inherently policy decisions beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary. However, the
Supreme Court has stated that actual contamination would give a farmer
standing. 186 Using existing torts, coupled with punitive damages, would adequately
pressure GM seed distributors to tightly regulate the practices and geographic
distribution of their end-users. It is only fair that GMO intellectual property owners,
who have been enforcing their patent rights against infringers, should be liable for
the adverse consequences of uncontrolled propagation of their patented products.

186See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010).

